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2006

document version

Early version, also known as pre-print

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citation for published version (APA)

Chan, K., Menkveld, A. J., & Yang, Z. (2006). *Are Domestic Investors Better Informed than Foreign Investors? Evidence from the Perfectly Segmented Market in China*. (Research Memorandum; No. 2006-4). Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Bedrijfskunde.

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Are Domestic Investors Better Informed than Foreign Investors?

Evidence from the Perfectly Segmented Market in China

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February 2006

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Abstract

This paper uses the perfect market segmentation setting in China's stock market to examine whether foreign investors are at informational disadvantage relative to domestic investors. We analyze the price discovery roles of the A- (domestic investors) and B-share (foreign investors) markets in China using a new database of transactions data. Before Feb 19, 2001, the A-share market leads the B-share market in price discovery - the signed volume and quote revision of the A-share market have strong predictive ability for B-share quote returns, but not vice versa. After Feb 19, 2001, because some domestic investors are allowed to invest on the B-share market, we also find evidence for a reverse causality from the B-share to the A-share market. Nevertheless, the Hasbrouck (1995) information share analysis reveals that A-shares continue to dominate price discovery.

Keywords: market microstructure, informational role, segmented markets, Chinese stock markets

Introduction

Are foreign investors at informational disadvantage relative to domestic investors? This has been one of the most frequently researched topics in the international finance literature. There is popular belief that the existence of the home bias – the phenomenon that investors overweight the domestic market and underweight the foreign market in their international portfolios – is related to informational asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors (Brennan and Cao (1997), Kang and Stulz (1997) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)). Calvo and Mendoza (2000) further argue that the informational disadvantage of foreign investors will cause contagion across international markets.

Despite the prevailing view on the informational disadvantage of foreign investors, a number of studies show that foreign investors enjoy informational advantage instead. According to Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) and Seasholes (2000), as a result of better access to expertise and talent, foreign investors, who are mostly institutional investors, should be smarter than local investors. In the Finnish stock market, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) find that foreigners buy more stocks that perform better in the next 120 trading days than do domestic individual investors. Seasholes (2000) also finds that foreign investors buy (sell) ahead of good (bad) earnings announcements in Taiwan. In these empirical works, the short-term price performance of trades by foreign versus domestic investors are typically compared. Based on data on institutional equity flows, Froot and Ramadorai (2001) find that foreign purchases predict not only prices in foreign markets, but also prices of closed-end country funds, indicating that foreigners have better information than local investors.

There are, however, a few exceptions to show that domestic investors are better informed. For example, Choe, Kho and Stulz (2000) use trade data from Korea and Hau (2001) use trade data from Germany, and both of them find evidence that domestic individual investors have a short-lived private information advantage on individual stocks over foreign investors. Dvorak (2002) also uses transaction data from Indonesia and shows that domestic investors have higher profits than foreign investors. He finds that clients of global brokerages have higher long-term and smaller medium (intramonth) and short (intraday) term profits than clients of local brokerages. This suggests that clients of

local brokerages have a short-lived information advantage, but that clients of global brokerages are better at picking long-term winners.

In this paper, we propose to study the informational advantage of domestic investors relative to foreign investors in China's stock market by inferring information transmission from the dynamic relationship among intraday returns and order flows in the markets for these two classes of investors.¹ A unique feature of China's stock market is that the A-share market (for domestic investors) and B-share market (for foreign investors) are completely segmented before Feb 19, 2001. Therefore, we could directly investigate which market has more price discovery by inferring from the information transmission process between the two markets.

We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the interrelationships between the segmented markets of the Chinese A- and B- shares using transactions data. We employ an extended VAR for multiple markets to examine the dynamic relationship among trades and quote revisions in the A- and B-share markets, which gives direct evidence of which market is faster in processing and discovering information and of the nature of the informational linkage between the two markets. If domestic investors have an informational advantage, then the A-share market plays a key role in discovering information. The trades and returns on the A-share market will thus have predictive ability for subsequent trades and returns on the B-share market. Besides the VAR, we also employ a VECM to examine the co-integrating relationship between A- and B-share prices and calculate the Hasbrouck (1995) information shares for the two markets, as well as conducting an event analysis based on large order imbalance intervals.

Another contribution of the study is that a policy change in China provides us another opportunity to infer informational advantages of domestic and foreign investors. In Feb 19, 2001, the Chinese government introduced a new policy that allowed domestic investors with foreign currency holdings to buy B-shares. We hypothesize that before the policy was adopted when domestic investors could trade only in the A-share market, information is mainly discovered in the A-share market so that trades in the A-share market have predictive ability for subsequent trades and quote

revisions in the B-share market. However, after the implementation of new policy, since domestic individual investors could also trade in the B-share market, the B-share market also contributes to the price discovery and would have predictive ability for the A-share market as well.

A couple of previous studies have also investigated the information transmission between the markets for domestic and foreign investors in China (Chakravarty, Sarkar and Wu (1998) and Chui and Kwok (1998)).² Both of these papers focus on the period before the policy change in February 2001. While Chakravarty, Sarkar and Wu (1998) find that A-share returns lead B-share returns more than vice versa, Chui and Kwok (1998) find opposite results. Therefore, the results are inconclusive. A shortcoming of these studies is that their analyses are based on daily return data. If stock prices adjust to information rapidly, the dynamic relationship among different markets will not be detected in the daily data. It is therefore important to conduct analyses using data of higher frequency. Furthermore, by limiting their investigations to the stock returns, these studies also ignore the information content of order flows, which have been shown to have predictive ability for subsequent returns (see Hasbrouck (1991) and Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997)).

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the market structure of China's stock market. Section 3 develops the empirical methodology for investigating the hypothesized relationships and derives empirical predictions. Section 4 describes the data and provides summary statistics. Section 5 presents empirical results while Section 6 concludes the paper.

2. Structure of China's A- and B-Share Markets

China's two stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), were established in December 1990 and July 1991, respectively. Two types of shares are traded on the SZSE and the SHSE. A-shares are denominated in Chinese RMB and can only be purchased by domestic investors. B-shares are denominated in either US\$ (SHSE) or HK\$

¹ This empirical methodology has been widely adopted in investigating the informational roles of the derivatives market and the underlying cash market (see, e.g., Kawaller, Koch, and Koch (1990), Stoll and Whaley (1987), Stephan and Whaley (1990), Chan (1992), and Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998)).

² A number of papers examine the B-share discount (relative to the A-share) in China's stock market, including Chan, Menkveld, and Yang (2004), Karolyi and Li (2003), Chen and Xiong (2001), and Mei, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)). In

(SZSE), and could be purchased only by overseas investors prior to Feb 19, 2001. By the end of December 2001, a total of 1,160 A- and B- shares stocks were listed on both stock exchanges with a total market capitalization of RMB 4,352.22 billion (or USD 525.75 billion). Of these, 1,048 were A-shares targeting domestic investors and 112 were B-shares for foreign investors, with 88 listed companies issuing both A- and B- shares.

Because A- and B-shares are issued to two different types of investors, the A- and B-share markets are fully segmented. After Feb 19, 2001, the government implemented a new policy by opening the B-share market to domestic individual investors with foreign currency holdings. As a result, the A- and B-share markets are now no longer completely segmented. But because the RMB is not fully convertible, Chinese citizens still cannot freely buy foreign currencies to purchase B-shares, which means that there currently remains a certain degree of segmentation between the two markets.³

The trading system in the SZSE and the SHSE is based on the electronic consolidated open limit order book (COLOB). The trading hours for both the SZSE and SHSE are from 9:30a.m. to 11:30a.m. and from 1:00p.m. to 3:00p.m. in the afternoon. The market opening is based on a batch (consolidated) auction that operates from 9:15a.m. to 9:25a.m., followed by a continuous auction after 9:30a.m. After a lunch break, the market reopens in the afternoon directly with a continuous auction without the consolidated auction. The minimum tick sizes are 1 cent (RMB 0.01 Yuan) for A-shares in both exchanges, US\$ 0.002 (US\$ 0.001) for B-shares in SHSE before (after) Jan 1, 2001, and HK\$ 0.01 for B-shares in SZSE.

An important feature of the listed companies in China's stock market is that the ownership structure is divided into negotiable publicly owned shares and non-negotiable state-owned or corporation-owned (legal person) shares, which comprises about two-thirds of all outstanding shares. The negotiable publicly owned shares include A-shares, B-shares, H-shares (listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange) and N-shares (listed on the New York Stock Exchange). The non-negotiable shares include state-owned shares, which are shares held by the government through a designated

particular, Chan, Menkveld and Yang (2004) show that the B-share discount is related to the information asymmetry between foreign and domestic investors.

³ While it is possible that some domestic investors buy foreign currency in the black market, the formal channels for access to foreign currency are quite limited.

government agency and legal person shares (i.e., domestic and overseas economic entities but not individuals). These shares are illiquid and are traded off-exchange at a substantial discount relative to the net asset value per share.

3. Methodology and Empirical Predictions

We use three methodologies to trace whether domestic investors are better informed than domestic investors: (1) an extended VAR for multiple markets, (2) a VECM to explicitly model a potential cointegrating relation between A- and B-share prices and calculate the Hasbrouck (1995) information shares, and (3) an event analysis based on large order imbalance intervals.

3.1 Extended VAR for Multiple Markets

We follow Hasbrouck (1991) in modeling the dynamic relationship among trades and quotes in the A- and B-share markets. Hasbrouck proposes a bivariate VAR model of the trades and quote revisions for an individual stock to measure the information content of stock trades:

$$r_t = a_1 r_{t-1} + \dots + a_p r_{t-p} + b_0 z_t + b_1 z_{t-1} + \dots + b_p z_{t-p} + \varepsilon_{1,t} \quad (1)$$

$$z_t = c_1 r_{t-1} + \dots + c_p r_{t-p} + d_1 z_{t-1} + \dots + d_p z_{t-p} + \varepsilon_{2,t} \quad (2)$$

where r_t is the quote return at transaction time t , which is the change in the bid-ask midpoint from the quotes following transaction $t-1$ to the quotes following transaction t , and z_t is the signed volume (positive if buyer-initiated, negative if seller-initiated) of transaction t . It is assumed that the disturbances in the two equations have zero means and are jointly and serially uncorrelated. In the model, there is a presumption of causality running from both contemporaneous and lagged trades to quote revisions, but from only lagged quote revisions to trades.

We will extend Hasbrouck's model to multiple markets. Suppose a company i issues A- and B- shares. We define $r_{i,t} = [r_{i,t}^A, r_{i,t}^B]'$ and $z_{i,t} = [z_{i,t}^A, z_{i,t}^B]'$, where $r_{i,t}^A$ and $r_{i,t}^B$ represent quote returns of A-shares and B-shares of company i during time interval t , $z_{i,t}^A$ and $z_{i,t}^B$ represent the

signed volume in the respective markets during time interval t . The time interval is five minutes, ten minutes or 15 minutes. Allowing for individual firm effects, we use the panel data to model the dynamic relationship among the trades and quote revisions in two markets as follows:

$$r_{i,t} = \alpha_i + a_1 r_{i,t-1} + \dots + a_p r_{i,t-p} + b_0 z_{i,t} + b_1 z_{i,t-1} + \dots + b_p z_{i,t-p} + \varepsilon_{1i,t} \quad (3)$$

$$z_{i,t} = \beta_i + c_1 r_{i,t-1} + \dots + c_p r_{i,t-p} + d_1 z_{i,t-1} + \dots + d_p z_{i,t-p} + \varepsilon_{2i,t} \quad (4)$$

where $\alpha_i = [\alpha_i^A, \alpha_i^B]'$, $\beta_i = [\beta_i^A, \beta_i^B]'$, α_i^A , α_i^B , β_i^A , β_i^B are firm dummies capturing the firm-specific features, $a_1, \dots, a_p, b_0, b_1, \dots, b_p$, $c_1, \dots, c_p, d_1, \dots, d_p$ are (2x2) matrices of coefficients, while $\varepsilon_{1i,t}$ and $\varepsilon_{2i,t}$ are (2x1) vectors of disturbance terms. Based on the system of equations, we see, for example, whether trades in the A-share market contain information and cause quote revision in the B-share market after controlling for trades in the B-share market and lagged quote revisions in the two markets.

A key hypothesis is that domestic investors have more private information than foreign investors. We conjecture that prior to Feb 19, 2001, when domestic investors could trade only on the A-share market while foreign investors could trade only on the B-share market, private information is discovered predominantly in the A-share market. Therefore, we predict that A-share returns lead B-share returns more than vice versa. After Feb 19, 2001, since some domestic investors (with foreign currency holdings) began to trade on the B-share market, we expect that B-share returns lead A-share returns.

In general, the price impact of trades comes from both liquidity and information effects. If the price impact stems only from the liquidity effect, it is temporary and should be confined to the market where the trades appear and it will not spillover to the other market. Therefore, signed volume in A-shares will trigger price changes in the A-share market but not in the B-share market, while signed volume in B-shares will trigger price changes in the B-share market and not in the A-share market. On the other hand, if the price impact stems from the information effect, it is permanent and will spillover to the other market. If, for example, informed trades occur mostly in the A-share market

prior to Feb 19, 2001, positive (negative) signed volume in A-shares will be accompanied by price increases (decreases) in both the A- and B-share markets. On the other hand, if informed trades also occur in the B-share market after Feb 19, 2001, positive (negative) signed volume in B-shares will be accompanied by price increases (decreases) in both markets.

Besides the price impact, the information effect might also predict the lead-lag relationship between signed volume in both markets. Suppose we hypothesize that before Feb 19, 2001, trades by domestic investors in the A-share market will convey information to foreign investors. If some foreign investors in the B-share market react to the A-share market trading activity faster than others, they will buy (sell) more in the B-share market whenever they observe positive (negative) signed volume. In that case, the signed volume in the A-share market will also lead the signed volume in the B-share market.⁴ But, after Feb 19, 2001, as information is discovered in both markets, the signed volume in both markets will be positively correlated with lagged signed volume of the other market.

3.2 Hasbrouck (1995) Information Shares

Another methodology to establish how much a market contributes to price discovery when a security trades in multiple markets is the cointegration analysis developed in Hasbrouck (1995). In this framework, the price differential across markets is stationary to eliminate arbitrage opportunity. In a statistical sense, all prices in the system are non-stationary, but cointegrated as they share one common stochastic trend - the (unobserved) efficient price process. However, we need to be careful in implementing this methodology, as cointegration is not guaranteed for our price series, in particular for the time period (prior Feb 19, 2001) when both markets are fully segmented.⁵ Because the market price of risk is likely to differ across markets, this could drive a wedge between the two price series. In the implementation, we first test for cointegration by an augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the price differential across markets. If markets are cointegrated, as detected by the rejection of a unit root in the price differential series, we estimate the VECM model suggested by Hasbrouck (1995):

$$r_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \phi_i (P_{i,t-1}^A - P_{i,t-1}^B) + a_1 r_{i,t-1} + a_2 r_{i,t-2} + \dots + a_p r_{i,t-p} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (5)$$

⁴ However, if foreign investors in the B-share market react to the trading activity in the A-share market immediately, then B-share prices will adjust instantaneously so that no foreign investor will find it profitable to trade on that piece of information.

⁵ Arbitrage, in this case, is hard as A- and B-shares are not exchangeable and short positions are forbidden.

where $\varphi_i(P_{i,t-1}^A - P_{i,t-1}^B)\iota$ represents the additional error-correction term, with $\iota = [1, 1]'$ and $\varphi_i = [\varphi_i^A, \varphi_i^B]'$, and the other terms are as defined earlier.. The information share of a market is then determined by a Cholesky decomposition of the variance matrix of the permanent price change, which is detailed in Hasbrouck (1995). We hypothesize that, if A- and B-price series are cointegrated, quote changes in the A-share market have the highest information share.

3.3 Analysis based on Large Order Imbalance Events

In addition to the analysis based on regular trading, we follow Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2000) and focus on price discovery around unusual trading events, i.e. disproportionate order imbalances. We first condition on those 5-minute intervals with highest absolute order imbalance in the A-share market and study immediate and cumulative A- and B-share returns for an event window that includes ten 5-minute intervals before and after the event. This allows us to study the impact of large A-share buying or selling on A-share prices and, more importantly, on B-share prices. We then condition on 5-minute intervals with disproportionate B-share imbalance and conduct a similar analysis with special focus on the impact on A-share (cumulative) returns. We conduct these analyses before and after domestic investors are allowed to buy B-shares (Feb 19, 2001). Our hypothesis is that A-share order imbalance events affect B-share prices to a much larger degree than vice versa.

4. Data and Preliminary Statistics

4.1 Sample

The analysis is based on the real-time data disseminated to the traders' terminals at the SZSE and the SHSE. Our database includes all transactions data for A- and B-shares listed on the SZSE and the SHSE, including the best three bid and ask quotes, transaction prices and volumes for each trade.

The sample period is from Jan 10, 2000 to Nov 8, 2001. To examine the impact of the policy change of allowing domestic investors to trade on the B-share market, we partition our sample into two sub-periods: one before Feb 19, 2001 and one after. We limit the sample firms to those that have both A- and B-shares listed throughout the sample period. Altogether, we have 76 listed companies in

the sample, with 38 listed on the SHSE and another 38 listed on the SZSE.

To avoid price irregularities during the opening and closing periods, we exclude the first and last 15-minute intervals in the morning and afternoon trading sessions in the analysis. All trades and quotes during the rest of the trading period are included in the sample. However, we impose several filters to remove data errors. First, trades and quotes with negative values are removed. Second, since there is a price limit of 10%, a trade that deviates in price more than 10% from the previous trade is eliminated.⁶ Third, stale quotes, which are identified as quotes with zero depth, are removed. Fourth, trades with a zero price or zero volume are eliminated. Finally, if a stock reaches the price limit so that transactions are only allowed to take place within the limit bands, observations for that stock on that particular day are excluded.

For each trade, we determine whether it is buyer-initiated or seller-initiated. The sign of a trade is established based on the algorithm proposed in Lee and Ready (1988), where we compare the current trade price with the previous quote. The trade is classified as buyer- (seller-) initiated if the trade price occurs at the ask (bid). If the trade price lies within the spread, we record the trade as buyer- (seller-) initiated if the trade price is closer to the ask (bid). If the trade occurs exactly at the midpoint, we employ a tick test by comparing the trade price with the preceding trade price(s). A trade is classified as buyer- (seller-) initiated if it occurs on an uptick (downtick) or a zero uptick (downtick). When a trade occurs on consecutive zero ticks, it is not classified.

4.2 Summary Statistics

Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the A- and B- shares in the two sub-periods. We report the number of trading days, daily number of trades, average trade size and average daily trading volume. Prior to Feb 19, 2001, the daily average number of trades of the A-share market is 248, which is 7.1 times that of the B-share market. The average daily trading volume of the A-share market is 2.45 times larger than that of the B-share market. This indicates that A-shares are much more actively traded than B-shares. However, the average trade size in the A-share market is much smaller, being 35.6% of that in the B-share market.

After Feb 19, 2001, the trading activity on the B-share market increased substantially. The

daily average number of trades in the A- and B-share markets is 173 and 153, respectively. The average daily trading volume in the A-share market is only 37.4% of that in the B-share market, while the average trade size of A-shares is roughly 32.8% of that of B-shares. The percentages of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades of A- and B-shares are basically the same before and after Feb 19, 2001.

The minimum tick sizes are 1 cent (RMB 0.01 Yuan) for A-shares in both exchanges, US\$ 0.002 (US\$ 0.001) for B-shares in SHSE before (after) Jan 1, 2001, and HK\$ 0.01 for B-shares in SZSE. When expressed in RMB, the tick size for B-shares in Shanghai is roughly 2 cents before Jan 1, 2001. Because of the large tick size in the B-share market, informed investors might be constrained from trading there, causing the B-share market to react to information slower than the A-share market would. However, Table 1 shows that the average bid-ask spread for B-shares on the SHSE is US\$ 0.0035 before Jan 1, 2001, indicating that the bid-ask spread is usually much larger than the tick size and therefore the tick size is not a binding constraint. Therefore, if we find that A-shares lead B-shares in information discovery, this is not entirely due to the different tick sizes of the two markets.

Table 2 presents the percentages of non-trading intervals for A- and B-shares. Before Feb 19, 2001, the percentages of non-trading intervals for A-shares are 6.4%, 3.7%, and 3.1% based on 5-minute, 10-minute and 15-minute intervals, while the percentages for B-shares are 57.9%, 41.8% and 33.2%. After Feb 19, 2001, while the percentages of the non-trading intervals for A-shares remain similar, the percentages for B-shares decrease substantially to 13.1%, 6.3%, and 4.4%. This is consistent with the conjecture that the new policy implemented on Feb 19, 2001 attracted domestic investors to the B-share market so that the B-share market became more active than before the policy change.

5. Empirical Results

5.1 Extended VAR for Multiple Markets

⁶ The price limit is 5% for the special treatment stocks.

5.1.1 Regression Results based on 5-minute Returns

We discard the first and last 15-minutes in both the morning and afternoon sessions and partition the remaining trading hours (9:45a.m.-11:15a.m. in the morning session and 1:15p.m. - 2:45p.m. in the afternoon session) into 5-minute intervals. For both A- and B- shares, we generate 5-minute return series using the last bid and ask quotes in each interval. If no quote is available for a time interval, we use the bid-ask quote from the previous interval. The return is calculated as the log of the ratio of quote midpoints in successive intervals. We also calculate the signed volume (the difference between the buyer-initiated and seller-initiated volume) in each 5-minute interval for both A- and B- shares. In order to control for the cross-sectional variations across different stocks, we follow Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) and standardize the return and signed volume variables. For each trading day, we first calculate the mean and standard deviation for a variable. The variable is then standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. All observations for each sub-period are pooled together for regression analysis to increase the power of the tests.

We estimate the multivariate VAR model in Equations (3) and (4). Since the returns and signed volumes are standardized, we can assume that the disturbances are homoskedastic. Furthermore, as we include lagged values of the dependent variables on the right-hand side to capture serial dependency effects, the disturbances are serially uncorrelated. We allow contemporaneous correlation in residual returns and residual signed volumes across the markets. However, the correlation between residuals of returns and signed volumes should be close to zero as returns are orthogonalized with respect to signed volume in Equation (3). We choose the contemporaneous (if applicable) and six lags for each explanatory variable and find that using more lags does not affect the results. Reported t-statistics are based on White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.

A. Lead-Lag Relationship of Quote Returns

Results based on 5-minute intervals are presented in Table 3. In the equations explaining returns of A- and B-shares, the coefficients relating returns to their own lags are significantly negative at the 0.1% level in both the first and second sub-period, suggesting that there is a temporary price component that tends to reverse over time.

In the first sub-period, once the signed volume is controlled for, the quote return in the A-share market predicts the quote return in the B-share market but not vice versa. In the equation explaining A-share stock returns, the coefficients for the first and second lagged B-share returns are 0.004 and 0.001 and are not significantly different from zero (t-statistics = 1.67 and 0.47). In the equation explaining B-share stock returns, the coefficients for the first and second lagged A-share returns are 0.033 and 0.022 and are significant at the 0.1% level (t-statistics = 13.76 and 8.83). These results are consistent with the hypothesis that information is discovered mainly in the A-share market before Feb 19, 2001.

The empirical results change substantially in the second sub-period (after Feb 19, 2001), as the quote returns in both A- and B-share markets have predictive ability for each other. In the equation explaining A-share returns, the coefficients for the first and second lagged B-share returns are 0.069 and 0.030 with t-statistics of 28.49 and 12.24, while in the equation explaining B-share stock returns, the coefficients for the first and second lagged A-share returns are 0.045 and 0.007 with t-statistics of 19.76 and 3.08. Therefore, information is discovered in both markets after Feb 19, 2001.

B. Effects of Signed Volume on Quote Returns

Table 3 shows that the stock returns of A- and B-shares are significantly affected by the signed volume in their own markets. Furthermore, the signed volume impacts not only contemporaneous stock returns, but also future stock returns. In the equation explaining A-share returns, the coefficients for the contemporaneous, the first lagged and the second lagged A-share signed volumes are positive and strongly significant in both sub-periods. In the equation explaining B-share returns, the coefficients for the contemporaneous, the first lagged and the second lagged B-share signed volumes are also significantly positive.

The effect of the signed volume on the stock returns in the other market is, however, different between the A- and B- share markets. Before Feb 19, 2001, while the B-share stock returns are affected by contemporaneous, the first lagged and the second lagged A-share signed volume, the A-share stock returns are affected by B-share signed volume only at the contemporaneous level. However, the effect of the B-share volume on the A-share stock returns becomes much stronger after

Feb 19, 2001. In the equation explaining A-share returns, the coefficients of the contemporaneous and first lagged B-share signed volume are 0.087 and 0.014 and are significantly different from zero (t-statistics = 48.40 and 5.93). This confirms the B-share market gained more information content after some domestic investors are allowed to trade in the B-share market.

C. Relationship among the Signed Volumes

We also find that the signed volumes in the A-share and B-share markets are negatively auto-correlated. This result is consistent with the negative autocorrelation of the quote returns and suggests that there is a reversal of order flows in both markets. The cross-market relationship is however quite different before and after Feb 19, 2001. In the first sub-period, the coefficients of the first and second lagged B-share signed volumes in explaining A-share signed volumes are small and insignificant. On the other hand, the coefficients of the first and second lagged A-share signed volumes in explaining B-share signed volume are positive and significant. But after February 19, 2001, while the A-share signed volume continues to have predictive ability for the subsequent B-share signed volume, the causality also runs the other direction. For example, the coefficient of the first lagged B-share signed volume in explaining B-share signed volume is 0.040 and significantly different from zero (t-statistic = 13.46).

D. Impulse Response Functions to Differentiate Transitory and Permanent Effects

Figures 1 and 2 graph the impulse response functions to investigate whether the previous results on lead-lag relationship pertain to permanent (information) effects or temporary (liquidity) effects. The two graphs on the left-hand side of Figure 1 depict B-share cumulative return response to an A-share impulse (top graph) and A-share cumulative return response to an B-share impulse (bottom graph) before Feb 19, 2001, and the two graphs on the right-hand side are after. We study two types of impulses: a one standard deviation quote return and a one standard deviation signed volume impulse. The response is measured in standard deviation units as all data are standardized before estimation. Before Feb 19, 2001, for both types of impulses the B-share market responds much stronger to A-share impulses than vice versa. The long term effect of an A-share signed volume impulse is, for example, a (cumulative) B-share return of 0.06 vis-à-vis an A-share return of 0.01 on a similar B-share impulse. We find similar differences for quote return impulses. After Feb 19, 2001, the

discrepancy between the effect of the A-share market on B-share returns and the effect of the B-share market on A-share returns disappears, confirming that the two markets become less segmented.

Figure 2 depicts cumulative signed volume response in both markets to a one standard deviation A-share quote return and a one standard deviation B-share quote return impulse. Before Feb 19, 2001, the A-share quote return has a much stronger impact on signed volume than the B-share quote return. A shock of one standard deviation of A-share quote return gives a long-term effect of 0.08 for A-share signed volume and 0.06 for B-share signed volume. On the other hand, a shock of one standard deviation of B-share quote return produces a negligible effect on signed volume. These results indicate a difference between the trading strategies of domestic and foreign investors. In the A-share market, domestic investors pursue a positive feedback trading strategy, whereby they will buy (sell) more subsequent to an increase (decrease) in A-share return. On the other hand, in the B-share market, foreign investors do not react to B-share price movement. After Feb 19, 2001, the discrepancy between the effect of the A-share and B-share quote return on signed volume becomes smaller. Nevertheless, it remains that there is more evidence of positive feedback strategy in the A-share market than in the B-share market.

5.1.2 Robustness Tests

A. Regression Results based on 10- and 15-minute Returns

Our earlier results in Table 2 show that the B-share market is subject to the non-trading problem, especially in the first sub-period. To circumvent this problem, we also perform the analysis based on 10-minute and 15-minute intervals. We only report the results based on the 15-minute intervals in Table 4, because the results based on the 10-minute intervals are similar. In general, the results are similar to those based on the 5-minute intervals. Before Feb 19, 2001, lagged returns and the lagged signed volume of the A-shares have predictive ability for B-share returns but not vice versa. After Feb 19, 2001, the stock returns and signed volumes of the B-share have predictive ability for A-share returns.

B. Analysis Based on the Transaction Clock of the B-share Market

So far, the analysis has been based on fixed time intervals. Because the B-shares are infrequently traded so that their prices do not react to information instantaneously if no transaction

takes place, the trades and price movements in the B-share market might lag behind those in the A-share market. The infrequent trading problem will overestimate the influence of the A-share market on the B-share market. To circumvent this problem, we also construct time intervals of variable lengths in accordance with the transaction clock of the B-share market. In the transaction clock framework, if z_t^B measures the signed volume of the t^{th} trade in the B-share market, z_t^A measures the cumulative signed volume in the A-share market between the $(t-1)^{\text{th}}$ trade and t^{th} trade of the B-share market. The results are presented in Table 5.

Compared with previous results, the impact of the signed volume of B-shares is larger. In fact, in the second sub-period, in the equation explaining the B-share returns, the coefficients for the lagged signed volume of the A-shares are not significantly positive, but in the equation explaining the A-share returns, the coefficients of the first and second lagged signed volumes of the B-shares are significantly positive. Also, in the second sub-period, the lagged signed volume of the B-shares leads the signed volume of the A-shares more than vice versa. These results are not surprising. In a transaction clock analysis when a time interval is created conditional on the occurrence of B-share trades, there is a bias favoring the informational role of the B-share market. In other words, the increased role of the B-share volume might be artificial. Nevertheless, based on the returns analysis, we still find that the A-share returns significantly affect the B-share returns more than vice versa in the first sub-period. The causality, however, runs in both directions in the second sub-period. Therefore, our results that more information is discovered in the B-share market after Feb 19, 2001 remain robust.

C. Analysis Based on Different Post-Liberalization Sample Period

Our analyses so far are based on two sub-sample periods, one before Feb 19, 2001 and one after. Results indicate that more information is discovered in the B-share market after Feb 19, 2001, when domestic investors with foreign currency are allowed to purchase B-shares. During the transition period right after Feb 19, there was a massive convergence in prices across the two markets. According to Chan, Menkveld and Yang (2004), the B-share discounts drop from 72% to 43% after the liberalization. As the price adjustment is not instantaneous but rather gradual, the price

transmission process might be interfered during the transition period. We therefore also examine the information transmission process after June 1, 2001, which is 4 months subsequent to the liberalization so that the price convergence should already be completed.⁷ The results remain that the stock returns and signed volumes of the B-share have predictive ability for A-share returns after June 19, 2001, confirming that the price discovery also occurs in the B-share market.

D. SUR Regressions to Account for Potential Contemporaneous Correlations in Residuals

Our analysis so far has been assuming that the residuals are uncorrelated with each other. A violation of this assumption could over-state the t-statistics in our VAR estimation. For robustness check, we compute the correlations of residuals of the VAR model. Results are reported in Table 6, which contains correlations of residuals for the different VAR specifications, including estimation based on 5-minute interval, 15-minute interval, and transaction clock interval of B-shares. The correlation patterns are generally similar for the different VAR specifications. While residual returns and residual signed volume in the A- and B-share markets are correlated, they are uncorrelated among themselves. Furthermore, the correlations are higher after Feb 19, 2001. For example, based on the 5-minute interval and before Feb 19, 2001, the correlation of residual returns in the A- and B-share market is 0.023, and the correlation of residual signed volume in the A- and B-share market is 0.031. After Feb 19, 2001, the correlation of residual returns increases to 0.099 and the correlation of residual signed volume increases to 0.134. Given that the residuals in Equations (1) to (4) are contemporaneously correlated, we therefore also estimate the equations using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), and find that results are robust.

5.2 Hasbrouck (1995) Information Shares

Before Feb 19, 2001, there is no evidence of cointegration of A-share and B-share price series for 5- and 15-minute intervals. However, we do find cointegration for the daily price series after the B-share market is opened up to domestic investors on Feb 19, 2001. The augmented Dickey-Fuller

⁷ The liberalization is completed in two stages. From Feb 19 to May 31, 2001, only domestic investors who have foreign currency deposited in the Chinese bank before Feb 19, 2001 can purchase the B shares. Starting from June 1, 2001, domestic investors who have foreign currency deposited in the Chinese bank after Feb 19, 2001 can also purchase the B shares.

results, reported in Table 7, show that only for the daily frequency after Feb 19, price differentials are stationary for the majority of stocks (55 out of 76). We follow Maddala and Wu (1999) and summarize the cross-sectional test results in a joint test based on stock-specific p-values. This test only rejects the unit root (and thus establishes cointegration) for the daily series after Feb 19. We interpret the lack of cointegration prior to Feb 19 as empirical support for the markets being perfectly segmented.

As we only have cointegration for daily prices after Feb 19, 2001, we can estimate the information shares for these price series. The Hasbrouck information shares show that despite strong intraday information spillovers from the B-shares to the A-shares and vice versa after Feb 19, 2001, the A-shares continue to dominate price discovery at the daily level. Figure 3 presents the stock-specific lower and upper bound on the A-market information share. We interpret the lower bound as information uniquely assigned to the A-share market, the difference between lower and upper bound as information arriving at both markets simultaneously, and 100% minus the upper bound as information uniquely assigned to the B-share market. We find that, on average, 90.7% of the information is uniquely assigned to the A-market, 8.1% to both markets, and 1.2% the B-share market. Although we find considerable cross-sectional variation, the A-share contributes always more than half of the information, whereas the B-share contribution never exceeds 10%.

5.3 Analysis based on Large Order Imbalance Events

This section compares the price impact of large order imbalance events in the A and B-share markets before and after Feb 19, 2001. This is to see if previous results are robust during unusual periods. For each of the stocks listed on both the A- and B- share markets on either the SHSE or the SZSE, we select ten 5-minute intervals for the largest net-buy volume (positive signed volume) and another ten intervals for the largest net-sell volume (negative signed volume) in the A- and B-share markets. For each of the selected events, we examine the stock returns from the previous tenth (-10) to the subsequent tenth (+10) interval surrounding the event. We then calculate the mean-adjusted return by subtracting from the return for a given interval the sample average return for that interval on that day of the return.

Panel A of Table 8 presents results based on the order imbalance events in the A-share market.

To save space, only mean-adjusted return for intervals $-1, 0, 1$ and cumulative adjusted returns (CAR) over successive intervals are reported. We first discuss the results before Feb 19, 2001. First, the A-share order imbalance exerts a strong and significant price impact on the A-share stock returns. During the interval 0, the A-shares have a mean-adjusted return of 1.857% for buy imbalances and -1.139% for sell imbalances. There are signs that price effects occur even in earlier intervals. The mean-adjusted return during the interval $(-10, -1)$ is 0.576% for buy imbalances but much smaller for sell imbalances. Overall, the cumulative price impacts are much bigger for buy imbalances than for sell imbalances. During the interval $(-10, 10)$, the cumulative mean-adjusted returns are 1.344% (t-statistic = 11.38) for buy imbalances and -0.032% (t-statistic = -0.028) for sell imbalances. For convenience, in the rest of our discussion, we refer to the price reaction during the interval 0 as the immediate price impact and the price reaction during the interval $(-10, 10)$ as the permanent price impact. The impacts of the A-share buy and sell imbalances on the B-share returns are small though significant. The immediate price impacts on the B-shares are 0.164% for buy imbalances and -0.077% for sell imbalances. The permanent price impacts on the B-shares are 0.249% (t-statistic = 2.1) for buy imbalances and -0.184% (t-statistic = -1.58) for sell imbalances. After Feb 19, 2001, the order imbalances of the A-shares continue to have strong price impacts on A- and B-shares.

Panel B presents the price impacts of the B-shares. Before Feb 19, 2001, while the B-share order imbalances have significant price impacts on the B-shares, they have small and insignificant price impacts on the A-shares. For example, the immediate price impact on the A-shares is 0.007% conditional on the B-share buy imbalance and -0.025% conditional on the B-share sell imbalance. Both of these price impacts are statistically insignificant. After Feb 19, 2001, the impact of the B-share order imbalance on the A-share returns is much stronger. Conditional on the B-share buy imbalances, the immediate price impact on the A-share is 0.405% while the cumulative price impact is 1.164%. Conditional on the B-share sell imbalances, the immediate price impact on the A-shares is -0.334% while the cumulative price impact is 0.128%. Therefore, the results are consistent with those in previous sections that B-share abnormal volume contains more information after Feb 19, 2001.

6. Conclusion

We employ the perfect market segmentation setting in China's stock market to examine whether foreign investors are at informational disadvantage relative to domestic investors. Before Feb 19, 2001, all domestic investors trade only in the A-share market while all foreign investors trade only in the B-share market. Results show that the signed volume of the A-share market has strong predictive ability for A- and B-share quote returns, while the signed volume of the B-share market has little predictive ability for the A-share quote return. Furthermore, while the A-share quote revision has predictive ability for the B-share quote revision, the B-share quote revision has no predictive ability for the A-share quote revision. Therefore, the trades and quote revisions in the A-share market contained more information than those in the B-share market, suggesting that domestic investors have more information than foreign investors. After Feb 19, 2001 when domestic investors with foreign currency holdings are allowed to participate in the B-share market, the B-share quote revisions significantly affect the A-share quote revisions and the B-share signed volume affects both the A-share signed volume and quote revisions. This gives further support to the hypothesis that domestic investors are more informed than foreign investors. Because some domestic investors are allowed to trade in the B-share market after Feb 19, 2001, the trades and quote revisions in the B-share market also contain information.

Aggregating to a daily level, we find that in spite of the intraday bidirectional causality after Feb 19, 2001,, the A-share market continues to dominate price discovery as, across all the stocks, its Hasbrouck (1995) information share always exceeds 50%, against a less than 10% information share for the B-share market. This suggests some informed domestic investors still prefer to trade in the A-share market or do not have the foreign currency to trade in the B-share market.

We end the conclusion with a couple of notes. First, one should be cautious in interpreting our evidence that A-share returns leading B-share returns does not necessarily imply that domestic investors are better informed than foreign investors. Since trading activity in the B-share market is much thinner than in the A-share market, our results could be driven by strategic trading of informed investors who, potentially, trade slower in the B-share market to reduce the market impact. In other

words, foreign investors are not necessarily less informed, but they simply choose to act on their information more slowly. While we do not rule out this explanation, we should point out that informed foreign investors cannot be too “patient” with their trades as the A- and B-share markets are not isolated in terms of information transmission. As our results also show, both the quote return and signed volume in the B-share market react to the A-share price movement, and therefore informed foreign investors should feel pressure to trade their information before it is all incorporated into the B-share prices.

Second, one might question even if foreign investors face informational disadvantage relative to domestic investors, since they do not trade directly with domestic investors (at least before Feb 19, 2001), they would not be worse off if they are simply passive buy-and-hold investors who can minimize the adverse selection cost of trading with better informed investors. In a companion paper (Chan, Menkveld and Yang (2004)), we analyze the equilibrium condition when domestic investors are informed while foreign investors are not under the noisy rational expectations framework of Grossman and Stiglitz (1985). We show that if prices are not fully revealing, a condition that will be met if there is not a very high proportion of informed investors, foreign investors will still face a higher posterior variance of future payoffs (after learning from A-share prices) than domestic investors. In that regard, foreign investors who pursue a long-term buy-and-hold strategy will still earn lower risk-adjusted returns than domestic investors. If data on trading accounts of domestic and foreign investors are available, one could perform the analysis of Hau (2001) to compare their trading profits. We leave this for future work to pursue.

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Table 1. Summary Statistics of A- and B- Shares

	A-shares					B-shares				
	Average	Deviation	Maximum	Minimum	Median	Average	Deviation	Maximum	Minimum	Median
<i>Before Feb 19, 2001</i>										
Daily number of trades	248	77	458	121	242	35	16	104	12	33
Average trade size (in shares)	5785	2927	18257	2156	4901	16265	8870	40136	3536	13960
Daily volume (1,000 shares)	1570	1206	6568	260	1191	641	542	2272	48	440
Bid-ask spread (in cents)	2.6	1.4	10.8	1.1	2.3	SZ*: HK 3.5	HK 1.4	HK 7.9	HK 1.2	HK 3.4
						SH*: US 0.35	US 0.13	US 0.84	US 0.22	US 0.31
Buyer-initiated volume %	49.6	2.8	60.0	46.0	48.9	48.4	2.2	54.3	41.0	48.5
Seller-initiated volume %	48.2	2.9	51.7	38.0	49.1	46.4	2.8	53.5	36.9	46.4
Number of listed companies	76					76				
<i>After Feb 19, 2001</i>										
Daily number of trades	173	53	343	84	165	153	36	233	84	149
Average trade size (in shares)	4061	2023	11253	1434	3368	12401	6749	36020	4162	10501
Daily volume (1,000 shares)	775	613	3700	121	537	2073	1592	8201	408	1635
Bid-ask spread (in cents)	0.0307	0.0194	0.1254	0.0120	0.0245	SZ: HK 2.6	HK 1.0	HK 5.2	HK 1.2	HK 2.4
						SH: US 0.26	US 0.12	US 0.68	US 0.14	US 0.23
Buyer-initiated volume %	48.6	5.4	79.8	42.8	47.2	49.4	1.4	53.1	45.7	49.2
Seller-initiated volume %	49.7	5.5	55.3	18.4	51.0	48.7	1.3	52.0	45.4	48.7
Number of listed companies	76					76				

*SZ: Shenzhen Stock Exchange; SH: Shanghai Stock Exchange

Table 2. Non-Trading Probabilities in the A- and B-share Markets

This table presents the non-trading probabilities in the A- and B-share markets in two sub-periods. The probabilities reflect the percentage of 5-minute, 10-minute and 15-minute intervals having no new trades. The first sub-period is from Jan 10, 2000, to Feb 19, 2001, during which the B-share market is open only to foreign investors. The second sub-period is from Feb 19, 2001, to Nov 8, 2001, during which the B-share market was open also to domestic investors with foreign currency holdings.

	A-shares					B-shares				
	Average (in %)	Deviation (in %)	Maximum (in %)	Minimum (in %)	Median (in %)	Average (in %)	Deviation (in %)	Maximum (in %)	Minimum (in %)	Median (in %)
<i>Before Feb 19, 2001</i>										
5-minute intervals	6.4	2.9	16.6	2.9	5.5	57.9	13.1	82.0	19.5	58.3
10-minute intervals	3.7	1.1	7.0	1.2	3.5	41.8	14.0	71.1	9.0	40.8
15-minute intervals	3.1	0.8	5.4	0.9	3.1	33.2	13.2	62.3	6.2	31.0
Number of listed companies	76					76				
<i>After Feb 19, 2001</i>										
5-minute intervals	9.1	5.0	23.9	3.2	7.2	13.1	5.9	30.2	4.9	11.7
10-minute intervals	4.3	2.0	13.3	1.8	4.0	6.3	3.2	18.5	2.4	5.2
15-minute intervals	3.2	1.3	8.8	1.3	3.1	4.4	2.1	13.3	1.6	3.8
Number of listed companies	76					76				

Table 3. Relationship among Standardized 5-minute Returns and Signed Volumes of A- and B-shares

The following multivariate VAR model is estimated:

$$r_{i,t} = \alpha_i + a_1 r_{i,t-1} + \dots + a_p r_{i,t-p} + b_0 z_{i,t} + b_1 z_{i,t-1} + \dots + b_p z_{i,t-p} + \varepsilon_{1i,t}$$

$$z_{i,t} = \beta_i + c_1 r_{i,t-1} + \dots + c_p r_{i,t-p} + d_1 z_{i,t-1} + \dots + d_p z_{i,t-p} + \varepsilon_{2i,t}$$

where $\alpha_i = [\alpha_i^A, \alpha_i^B]'$, $\beta_i = [\beta_i^A, \beta_i^B]'$, $r_{i,t} = [r_{i,t}^A, r_{i,t}^B]'$ and $z_{i,t} = [z_{i,t}^A, z_{i,t}^B]'$, where α_i^A , α_i^B , β_i^A , β_i^B are dummies capturing the firm-specific features, $r_{i,t}^A$ and $r_{i,t}^B$ are the quote returns of the A-shares and B-shares of company i during the 5-minute time interval t , and $z_{i,t}^A$ and $z_{i,t}^B$ are the signed volumes (buyer-initiated volume minus seller-initiated volume) in the respective markets during time interval t . All return and signed volume series are standardized. We use contemporaneous (if applicable) and six times lagged explanatory variables and report the regression coefficients for the contemporaneous and first two lags (lags 3 through 6 not shown to save space) and t -statistics (in *italics*) with * indicating significance at the 0.1 percent level.

	Explanatory Variables																			
	Panel A: Before Feb 19, 2001										Panel B: After Feb 19, 2001									
	Stock return of A-share		Stock return of B-share		Signed volume of A-share			Signed volume of B-share			Stock return of A-share		Stock return of B-share		Signed volume of A-share			Signed volume of B-share		
	r_{t-1}^A	r_{t-2}^A	r_{t-1}^B	r_{t-2}^B	z_t^A	z_{t-1}^A	z_{t-2}^A	z_t^B	z_{t-1}^B	z_{t-2}^B	r_{t-1}^A	r_{t-2}^A	r_{t-1}^B	r_{t-2}^B	z_t^A	z_{t-1}^A	z_{t-2}^A	z_t^B	z_{t-1}^B	z_{t-2}^B
r_t^A	-0.132 -58.16*	-0.141 -62.16*	0.004 1.67	0.001 0.47	0.567 319.76*	0.092 41.58*	0.032 14.20*	0.016 9.01*	-0.004 -1.97	-0.002 -1.13	-0.145 -61.84*	-0.138 -58.47*	0.069 28.49*	0.03 12.24*	0.523 286.95*	0.093 42.16*	0.029 12.86*	0.087 48.40*	0.014 5.93*	-0.003 -1.48
r_t^B	0.033 13.76*	0.022 8.83*	-0.178 -79.01*	-0.125 -55.17*	0.02 10.66*	0.01 4.35*	0.007 3.00*	0.447 236.74*	0.097 45.02*	0.057 26.49*	0.045 19.76*	0.007 3.08*	-0.161 -68.50*	-0.167 -70.08*	0.076 42.87*	0.006 2.7	-0.01 -4.55*	0.587 334.97*	0.11 48.87*	0.035 15.44*
z_t^A	0.1 34.67*	0.006 1.96	0.005 1.7	-0.001 -0.36	-0.001 -0.42	-0.089 -31.46*		0 -0.12	-0.007 -2.86		0.061 20.06*	-0.002 -0.75	0.101 32.11*	0.028 8.83*	-0.003 -0.92	-0.101 -34.75*		0.04 13.46*	-0.002 -0.58	
z_t^B	0.045 15.69*	0.031 10.72*	-0.031 -11.44*	0 0.07	0.024 8.32*	0.014 4.79*		-0.022 -8.61*	-0.059 -22.72*		0.073 23.85*	0.012 4.02*	0.065 20.54*	-0.031 -9.71*	0.034 11.54*	-0.011 -3.89*		-0.004 -1.23	-0.099 -32.48*	

Table 4. Relationship among Standardized 15-minutes Returns and Signed Volumes of A- and B-shares

The following multivariate VAR model is estimated:

$$r_{i,t} = \alpha_i + a_1 r_{i,t-1} + \dots + a_p r_{i,t-p} + b_0 z_{i,t} + b_1 z_{i,t-1} + \dots + b_p z_{i,t-p} + \varepsilon_{1i,t}$$

$$z_{i,t} = \beta_i + c_1 r_{i,t-1} + \dots + c_p r_{i,t-p} + d_1 z_{i,t-1} + \dots + d_p z_{i,t-p} + \varepsilon_{2i,t}$$

where $\alpha_i = [\alpha_i^A, \alpha_i^B]'$, $\beta_i = [\beta_i^A, \beta_i^B]'$, $r_{i,t} = [r_{i,t}^A, r_{i,t}^B]'$ and $z_{i,t} = [z_{i,t}^A, z_{i,t}^B]'$, where α_i^A , α_i^B , β_i^A , β_i^B are dummies capturing the firm-specific features, $r_{i,t}^A$ and $r_{i,t}^B$ are the quote returns of the A-shares and B-shares of company i during the 15-minute time interval t , and $z_{i,t}^A$ and $z_{i,t}^B$ are the signed volumes (buyer-initiated volume minus seller-initiated volume) in the respective markets during time interval t . All return and signed volume series are standardized. We use contemporaneous (if applicable) and six times lagged explanatory variables and report the regression coefficients for the contemporaneous and first two lags (lags 3 through 6 not shown to save space) and t -statistics (in *italics*) with * indicating significance at the 0.1 percent level.

	Explanatory Variables																			
	Panel A: Before Feb 19, 2001										Panel B: After Feb 19, 2001									
	Stock return of A-share		Stock return of B-share		Signed volume of A-share			Signed volume of B-share			Stock return of A-share		Stock return of B-share		Signed volume of A-share			Signed volume of B-share		
	r_{t-1}^A	r_{t-2}^A	r_{t-1}^B	r_{t-2}^B	z_t^A	z_{t-1}^A	z_{t-2}^A	z_t^B	z_{t-1}^B	z_{t-2}^B	r_{t-1}^A	r_{t-2}^A	r_{t-1}^B	r_{t-2}^B	z_t^A	z_{t-1}^A	z_{t-2}^A	z_t^B	z_{t-1}^B	z_{t-2}^B
r_t^A	-0.295 -78.04*	-0.22- -59.89*	0.003 0.95	-0.004 -1.24	0.605 205.31*	0.123 32.37*	0.092 24.08*	0.028 9.45*	-0.003 -1	-0.006 -1.9	-0.292 -74.06*	-0.223 -58.98*	0.035 8.62*	0.021 5.25*	0.559 181.70*	0.118 30.54*	0.098 25.23*	0.15 49.14*	0.018 4.50*	0.021 5.23*
r_t^B	0.031 7.26*	0.009 2.16	-0.297 -79.21*	-0.239 -65.15*	0.053 16.34*	0.024 5.74*	0.018 4.38*	0.469 143.71*	0.143 38.40*	0.108 28.48*	0.019 5.07*	0.003 0.85	-0.314 -79.46*	-0.221 -57.02*	0.128 43.15*	0.017 4.57*	0.006 1.67	0.621 210.93*	0.137 35.33*	0.121 30.99*
z_t^A	0.06 11.87*	0.076 15.52*	-0.004 -0.99	-0.006 -1.44	-0.247 -49.76*	-0.291 -59.10*	-0.007 -1.64	-0.019 -4.28*	0.039 7.18*	0.066 12.79*	0.06 10.65*	0.065 11.84*	-0.267 -51.71*	-0.287 -55.51*	-0.009 -1.63	-0.033 -6.09*				
z_t^B	0.052 10.24*	0.027 5.56*	0.006 1.33	0.011 2.59	0.028 5.61*	0.003 0.66	-0.218 -49.43*	-0.257 -58.16*	0.048 8.91*	0.039 7.49*	0.018 3.23*	0.095 17.16*	-0.009 -1.78	-0.029 -5.62*	-0.257 -47.26*	-0.295 -54.25*				

Table 5. Relationship among Standardized Returns and Signed Volumes of A- and B- Shares Based on the Transaction Clock of B-share Market

The following multivariate VAR model is estimated:

$$r_{i,t} = \alpha_i + a_1 r_{i,t-1} + \dots + a_p r_{i,t-p} + b_0 z_{i,t} + b_1 z_{i,t-1} + \dots + b_p z_{i,t-p} + \varepsilon_{1i,t}$$

$$z_{i,t} = \beta_i + c_1 r_{i,t-1} + \dots + c_p r_{i,t-p} + d_1 z_{i,t-1} + \dots + d_p z_{i,t-p} + \varepsilon_{2i,t}$$

where $\alpha_i = [\alpha_i^A, \alpha_i^B]'$, $\beta_i = [\beta_i^A, \beta_i^B]'$, $r_{i,t} = [r_{i,t}^A, r_{i,t}^B]'$ and $z_{i,t} = [z_{i,t}^A, z_{i,t}^B]'$, where α_i^A , α_i^B , β_i^A , β_i^B are dummies capturing the firm-specific features, $r_{i,t}^A$ and $r_{i,t}^B$ are the quote returns of the A-shares and B-shares of company i during the time interval t based on the B-share transaction clock, and $z_{i,t}^A$ and $z_{i,t}^B$ are the signed volumes (buyer-initiated volume minus seller-initiated volume) in the respective markets during time interval t . All return and signed volume series are standardized. We use contemporaneous (if applicable) and six times lagged explanatory variables and report the regression coefficients for the contemporaneous and first two lags (lags 3 through 6 not shown to save space) and t -statistics (in *italics*) with * indicating significance at the 0.1 percent level.

	Explanatory Variables																				
	Panel A: Before Feb 19, 2001											Panel B: After Feb 19, 2001									
	Stock return of A-share		Stock return of B-share		Signed volume of A-share			Signed volume of B-share			Stock return of A-share		Stock return of B-share		Signed volume of A-share			Signed volume of B-share			
	r_{t-1}^A	r_{t-2}^A	r_{t-1}^B	r_{t-2}^B	z_t^A	z_{t-1}^A	z_{t-2}^A	z_t^B	z_{t-1}^B	z_{t-2}^B	r_{t-1}^A	r_{t-2}^A	r_{t-1}^B	r_{t-2}^B	z_t^A	z_{t-1}^A	z_{t-2}^A	z_t^B	z_{t-1}^B	z_{t-2}^B	
r_t^A	-0.046	-0.052	0.006	0.004	0.399	0.026	0.01	0.035	0.001	-0.005	-0.037	-0.017	0.038	0.032	0.389	0.026	0.018	0.049	0.006	0.006	
	-19.85*	-22.49*	2.43	1.71	193.19*	11.57*	4.51*	17.16*	0.55	-1.95	-30.36*	-14.06*	29.33*	24.11*	355.60*	22.13*	14.62*	45.01*	4.96*	4.34*	
r_t^B	0.03	0.027	-0.224	-0.128	0.021	0	-0.004	0.44	0.123	0.074	0.02	0.009	-0.082	-0.009	0.019	-0.004	-0.003	0.512	0.084	0.046	
	13.51*	12.25*	-97.14*	54.41*	10.55*	-0.02	-1.68	228.66*	56.48*	33.90*	17.73*	7.79*	-67.41*	-7.45*	19.02*	-3.22*	-2.93	502.63*	69.88*	38.06*	
z_t^A	0.076	0.056	0.006	0.001		0.009	-0.015		-0.005	-0.003	0.019	0.026	0.025	0.022		0.023	0.021		0.009	0.007	
	29.81*	21.69*	2.12	0.34		3.57*	-5.90*		-2.13	-1.12	14.02*	19.17*	17.23*	14.72*		17.52*	15.61*		6.31*	5.16*	
z_t^B	0.043	0.037	-0.071	-0.013		0.008	0.004		0.049	-0.004	0.028	0.017	0.004	0.048		0.002	-0.002		0.075	0.031	
	16.63*	14.18*	-25.68*	-4.56*		3.24*	1.61		18.62*	-1.63	20.23*	12.48*	2.76	32.96*		1.3	-1.2		52.44*	21.11*	

Table 6. Covariance and Correlation Matrix of VAR Model Residuals

We present the covariance and correlation matrix of the residuals estimated from the following VAR model:

$$r_{i,t} = \alpha_i + a_1 r_{i,t-1} + \dots + a_p r_{i,t-p} + b_0 z_{i,t} + b_1 z_{i,t-1} + \dots + b_p z_{i,t-p} + \varepsilon_{1i,t}$$

$$z_{i,t} = \beta_i + c_1 r_{i,t-1} + \dots + c_p r_{i,t-p} + d_1 z_{i,t-1} + \dots + d_p z_{i,t-p} + \varepsilon_{2i,t}$$

where $\alpha_i = [\alpha_i^A, \alpha_i^B]'$, $\beta_i = [\beta_i^A, \beta_i^B]'$, $r_{i,t} = [r_{i,t}^A, r_{i,t}^B]'$ and $z_{i,t} = [z_{i,t}^A, z_{i,t}^B]'$, where α_i^A , α_i^B , β_i^A , β_i^B are dummies capturing the firm-specific features, $r_{i,t}^A$ and $r_{i,t}^B$ are the quote returns of the A-shares and B-shares of company i during the time interval t , and $z_{i,t}^A$ and $z_{i,t}^B$ are the signed volume (buyer-initiated volume minus seller-initiated volume) in the respective markets during time interval t . The VAR model is estimated using data of 5-minute intervals, 15-minute intervals, and B-share transaction clock intervals (whereby a time interval is defined based on the occurrence of a transaction for the B-share market).

		Before Feb 19, 2001								After Feb 19, 2001							
		Covariance of Residues				Correlation of Residues				Covariance of Residues				Correlation of Residues			
		ε_1^A	ε_1^B	ε_2^A	ε_2^B	ε_1^A	ε_1^B	ε_2^A	ε_2^B	ε_1^A	ε_1^B	ε_2^A	ε_2^B	ε_1^A	ε_1^B	ε_2^A	ε_2^B
5-minutes	ε_1^A	0.573	0.014	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.023	0.000	0.000	0.553	0.053	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.099	0.000	0.000
	ε_1^B	0.014	0.657	0.000	0.000	0.023	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.053	0.523	0.000	0.000	0.099	1.000	0.000	0.000
	ε_2^A	0.000	0.000	0.923	0.029	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.031	0.000	0.000	0.931	0.126	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.134
	ε_2^B	0.000	0.000	0.029	0.935	0.000	0.000	0.031	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.126	0.952	0.000	0.000	0.134	1.000
15-minutes	ε_1^A	0.433	0.023	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.048	-0.001	0.000	0.418	0.073	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.179	0.000	0.000
	ε_1^B	0.023	0.533	0.000	0.000	0.048	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.073	0.390	0.000	0.000	0.179	1.000	0.000	0.000
	ε_2^A	0.000	0.000	0.764	0.057	-0.001	0.000	1.000	0.074	0.000	0.000	0.780	0.204	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.260
	ε_2^B	0.000	0.000	0.057	0.766	0.000	0.000	0.074	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.204	0.793	0.000	0.000	0.260	1.000
Transaction Clock of B-share																	
	ε_1^A	0.741	0.018	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.025	0.000	0.000	0.779	0.031	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.043	0.000	0.000
	ε_1^B	0.018	0.666	0.000	0.000	0.025	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.031	0.683	0.000	0.000	0.043	1.000	0.000	0.000
	ε_2^A	0.000	0.000	0.917	0.033	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.035	0.000	0.000	0.972	0.038	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.039
	ε_2^B	0.000	0.000	0.033	0.952	0.000	0.000	0.035	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.038	0.982	0.000	0.000	0.039	1.000

Table 7. Cointegration Tests A- and B-share Prices

This table presents the results of cointegration tests of A- and B-share prices for the 5-minute, 15-minute, and daily frequency. In our application, we test cointegration by studying stationarity of the price differential across markets: $y_{i,t} = P_i^A - P_i^B$ for stock i and time period t . We use the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test, which is based on the model:

$$\Delta y_{i,t} = \mu_i + \rho_i y_{i,t-1} + \sum_{j=1}^{k_i-1} \gamma_{i,j} \Delta y_{i,t-j} + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad \varepsilon_{i,t} \sim IID(0, \sigma_i^2), \quad \sigma_i^2 < \infty,$$

The null hypothesis is $H_{0i} : \rho_i = 0$ (no cointegration) and the alternative hypothesis is $H_{1i} : \rho_i < 0$. We report the number of tests that reject the null at a 5% significance level. We further do a joint test for the cross-section (N=76) using the Fisher test developed in Maddala and Wu (1999). The test statistic is based on the cross-section of p-values:

$$\Lambda = -2 \sum_{i=1}^N \ln p_i$$

The Λ statistic has a χ^2 distribution with $2N$ degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. If the independence assumption is violated, an asymptotic test can be constructed:

$$\bar{\Lambda} = \frac{\sqrt{N}(\bar{\pi} - 2)}{2} \quad \text{with} \quad \bar{\pi} = -\frac{2}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \ln p_i$$

The limiting distribution of the $\bar{\Lambda}$ statistic is standard normal. The test is one-sided and rejects for large values of $\bar{\Lambda}$.

	Panel A: Before Feb 19, 2001					Panel B: After Feb 19, 2001				
	# p significant at 5% ^a	Λ	p-value	$\bar{\Lambda}$	p-value	# p significant at 5% ^a	Λ	p-value	$\bar{\Lambda}$	p-value
5-minutes returns	0	74.67	1.00	-4.44	1.00	0	32.66	1.00	-6.84	1.00
15-minute returns	0	38.09	1.00	-6.53	1.00	0	14.83	1.00	-7.87	1.00
daily returns	10	99.39	1.00	-3.02	1.00	55	328.34	0.00	10.11	0.00

^a: Significant p implies that price series are cointegrated. The table reports the number of tests that are significant at 5% level out of a total of 76 stocks.

Table 8. Intraday Returns around 5-minute Intervals of Large Order-Imbalance Events

Order-imbalances (buyer-initiated volume minus seller-initiated volume) in the A- and B- share markets are calculated stock by stock and normalized by total volume for the stock on a particular day. The samples comprise ten intervals with the largest normalized buy and sell order-imbalances selected for each stock. For the mean-adjusted return, we use the means by day of week and by time of day. The CAR(−10, −1), CAR(0, +1), CAR(0, +10), and CAR(+1, +10) are the cumulative returns from interval −10 to −1, from 0 to +1, from 0 to +10, and from +1 to +10 (temporary effect), respectively, and the *t*-statistics are reported in *italics*. ** indicates significance at the 1% level, * at the 5% level. Panel A is based on the largest 10 normalized order-imbalance events in the A-share market, while Panel B is based on such events in the B-share market.

Panel A: Based on Order-Imbalance Events in the A-share Market									Panel B: Based on Order-Imbalance Events in the B-share Market								
Net Buy (N=760)					Net Sell (N=760)				Net Buy (N=760)					Net Sell (N=760)			
Event Interval	A Share Mean-adj Return		B Share Mean-adj Return		A Share Mean-adj Return		B Share Mean-adj Return		Event Interval	A Share Mean-adj Return		B Share Mean-adj Return		A Share Mean-adj Return		B Share Mean-adj Return	
Before Feb 19, 2001									Before Feb 19, 2001								
D -1	0.456	12.04**	0.061	1.58	-0.123	-3.79**	-0.074	-2.06*	D -1	0.051	1.37	-0.104	-2.95**	-0.073	-2.18*	-0.007	-0.21
D 0	1.857	35.34**	0.164	4.19**	-1.139	-28.7**	-0.077	-2.03*	D 0	0.007	0.2	1.206	20.99**	-0.025	-0.8	-1.355	-22.35**
D +1	0.059	1.3	0.206	4.78**	0.118	3.1**	-0.137	-3.42**	D +1	-0.023	-0.66	0.003	0.07	0.051	1.58	0.044	1.13
CAR (-10,-1)	0.576	5.79**	-0.054	-0.56	0.076	0.84	-0.304	-3.31**	CAR (-10,-1)	0.622	5.96**	-0.379	-4.04**	0.100	1	0.155	1.74
CAR (0,1)	1.915	31.02**	0.370	6.46**	-1.021	-20.53**	-0.215	-3.92**	CAR (0,1)	-0.016	-0.31	1.209	19.21**	0.026	0.56	-1.311	-21.38**
CAR (0,10)	0.768	7.79**	0.302	2.98**	-0.108	-1.13	0.120	1.22	CAR (0,10)	0.071	0.7	1.052	11.16**	0.415	4.23**	-0.895	-10.21**
CAR (1,10)	-1.089	-10.92**	0.138	1.42	1.032	11.17**	0.198	2.05**	CAR (1,10)	0.064	0.67	-0.154	-1.68	0.441	4.72**	0.460	5.27**
After Feb 19, 2001									After Feb 19, 2001								
D -1	0.282	8.56**	0.318	8.49**	-0.139	-4.56**	-0.244	-7.16**	D -1	0.329	8.99**	0.268	9.36**	-0.204	-6.27**	-0.142	-5.22**
D 0	1.657	31.69**	0.439	11.02**	-1.287	-27.8**	-0.183	-4.3**	D 0	0.405	10.49**	1.720	38.38**	-0.334	-9.44**	-1.424	-32.96**
D +1	0.198	4.7**	0.214	5.66**	0.187	4.82**	0.052	1.35	D +1	0.223	5.69**	0.119	3.06**	-0.193	-5.51**	0.075	1.85
CAR (-10,-1)	0.205	2.19*	0.554	5.87**	0.171	1.88	-0.212	-2.37*	CAR (-10,-1)	0.735	7.35**	0.272	3.24**	0.099	1.11	0.153	1.93
CAR (0,1)	1.855	29.91**	0.653	11.2**	-1.100	-20.22**	-0.131	-2.2*	CAR (0,1)	0.627	10.98**	1.839	34.13**	-0.527	-10.58**	-1.349	-25.91**
CAR (0,10)	1.237	12.53**	0.252	2.6**	-0.318	-3.24**	0.271	2.76**	CAR (0,10)	0.429	4.1**	1.149	13.16**	0.028	0.28	-0.584	-6.29**
CAR (1,10)	-0.419	-4.17**	-0.186	-2.05*	0.968	10.12**	0.454	4.68**	CAR (1,10)	0.024	0.24	-0.570	-6.62**	0.362	3.63**	0.840	9.13**

Figure 1. Impulse Response Functions for A- and B-Share Returns based on the 5-minute VAR Model

The impulse response functions are based on the parameter estimates reported in Table 3 using the Hasbrouck (1991) VAR model extended to multiple markets. They illustrate the response of A- and B-share cumulative returns to impulses of a one standard deviation quote return or a one-standard deviation signed volume in each market.




Figure 2. Impulse Response Functions for A- and B-Share Signed Volume based on the 5-minute VAR Model

The impulse response functions are based on the parameter estimates reported in Table 3 using the Hasbrouck (1991) VAR model extended to multiple markets. They illustrate the response of A- and B-share cumulative signed volume to impulses of a one standard deviation quote return in each market.




Figure 3. Hasbrouck (1995) Information Shares for the 76 Stocks

This figure depicts the Hasbrouck (1995) information shares for the 76 Chinese stocks that trade on the A- and B-share market. They are based on a vector error correction model (VECM) for daily returns from Feb 19 to Nov 8, 2001, a period during which A-share investors are allowed to trade in the B-share market. For this period and frequency, VECM estimates are appropriate as daily price series are cointegrated across markets (see Table 7). The methodology establishes upper and lower bounds for these information shares. We interpret the lower bound as information uniquely attributable to the A-share market. The differential between the lower and upper bound indicates the amount of information that arrives at both markets simultaneously and can, therefore, not be assigned to either market. The difference between the upper bound and 100% is uniquely attributable to the B-share market.

